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State Income Taxation of Out-of-State
Trademark Holding Companies
Tun-Jen Chiangt
In recent years, trademark holding companies have grown in
popularity as a method of minimizing state income taxes. Typically,
trademark holding companies are subsidiary companies incorporated
in a state that does not levy income taxes upon royalty income. These
companies are owned by parents operating in states that do tax such
royalty income. The parent company is able to avoid taxation on its
royalty income by transferring its trademarks to holding companies
and licensing the trademarks back, thereby shifting the income-
which would be taxed by the states in which it operates-to the
trademark holding company.
Given the recent financial crises faced by the states, many states
have sought ways to curb the effectiveness of trademark holding com-
panies as a tax-avoidance device.' States have attempted to limit the
ability of corporations to avoid taxes in three ways. The states have (1)
directly taxed the out-of-state trademark holding company for income
tax; (2) disallowed deductions to the parent corporation for royalty
payments, making the parent unable to shift income out of the state;
and (3) treated the parent and subsidiary as one unitary entity for in-
come tax purposes, making intra-entity transfers of income meaning-
less. This Comment analyzes the Commerce Clause2 concerns raised
by the various alternatives available to the states in closing this tax
loophole.
Part I of the Comment outlines the general structure of
trademark holding companies and their operation. Part II analyzes the
first suggested solution, directly taxing out-of-state trademark holding
companies. It concludes that this method of taxation is inconsistent
with the dormant Commerce Clause, which requires a physical pres-
t B.Com., L.L.B. 2001, The University of Melbourne; J.D. Candidate 2004, The University
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I See, for example, Virginia Young, Diverting Income Is Key to Game, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch BI (Sept 22, 2002) (discussing a proposal by the Missouri governor to close this tax
loophole). By one calculation, corporate income taxes as a share of all state taxes have fallen
from 10.2 percent in 1979 to 6.3 percent in 2000, though many factors contribute to this decline.
See Michael Mazerov, Closing Three Common Corporate Income Tax Loopholes Could Raise
Additional Revenue for Many States 1, online at http://www.cbpp.org/4-9-02sfp.pdf (visited Sept
18, 2003).
2 US Const Art 1, §8, cl 3.
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ence in the taxing jurisdiction. Part III analyzes the second and third
methods of taxing trademark holding companies, both of which focus
on the taxation of parent corporations. It argues that the second
method, a simple denial of income tax deductions to parent corpora-
tions, violates the Commerce Clause's "fair apportionment" require-
ment, which prohibits measures that intrinsically produce double taxa-
tion on interstate commerce. And although the third solution-that
states treat all parents and subsidiaries as unitary businesses for in-
come tax purposes-is permissible under the Commerce Clause, it is
excessive and unnecessarily costly to implement. Thus, Part III con-
cludes that the most effective solution, consistent with the Commerce
Clause, is a limited requirement that companies combine trademark
income and expense reporting.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK HOLDING COMPANIES
A. Structure and Operation of Trademark Holding Companies
Trademark holding companies are most commonly established in
Delaware and Nevada, states that do not tax the income from trade-
mark royalties, interest, or similar intangible income.'The royalties
paid to the trademark holding company by the parent are deductible
and thus reduce the taxable income of the parent entity, but they are
not taxed in the hands of the trademark holding company. In this way,
the parent corporation avoids income tax liability while enjoying the
advantages of doing business in the state levying the income tax.' The
royalty payment increases the value of the subsidiary trademark hold-
ing company, and the royalty is effectively returned to the parent cor-
poration through the payment of dividends or capital appreciation.
If the sole purpose of the royalty arrangement were to avoid state
income taxe's, it would be regarded as a "sham transaction" and ren-
dered ineffective.' However, the utility of the "sham transaction" doc-
trine is limited in this context. Rarely would the trademark holding
company serve no legitimate business purpose whatsoever.' Corpora-
3 See Virginia Young, Committee Preserves Business Tax Breaks, St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Al (May 15,2002).
4 The amount of otherwise taxable income that is shifted through this device is difficult to
estimate because much of the relevant information is confidential. As an example, however, one
trademark holding company had an income of $55 million in 1990 and paid no state income
taxes. See Geoffrey, Inc v South Carolina Tax Commission, 313 SC 15,437 SE2d 13,15 n 1 (1993).
5 See, for example, Syms Corp v Commissioner of Revenue, 436 Mass 505, 765 NE2d 758,
762-63 (2002) (describing the long-established state and federal tax practice of disregarding
transactions that have no substantive or business purpose).
6 See, for example, Sherwin-Williams Co v Commissioner of Revenue, 438 Mass 71, 778
NE2d 504, 513-14, 517 (2002) (stating that a subsidiary trademark holding company was not a
sham because it reinvested royalty income, did business with third parties, and paid expenses of
maintaining trademark).
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tions can often plausibly claim that economies of scale justify having a
subsidiary maintain and license its trademarks.
Thus, trademark holding companies present the problem that an
incentive to avoid taxes by shifting income to corporations located in
Nevada or Delaware is potentially accompanied by a legitimate busi-
ness purpose. Whether a royalty fee has been artificially inflated to
reduce income tax is difficult to determine-especially when (as often
is the case) there is no external market for the trademark. In response,
states have been forced to push the frontiers of their taxation powers
in dealing with trademark holding companies.
B. The States' Options in Seeking to Tax Trademark
Holding Companies
States aiming to tax the income represented by trademark royal-
ties have several options. These options are broadly divided along two
lines depending on whether the states are taxing the out-of-state hold-
ing company or the in-state parent.
First, states may attempt to tax the trademark holding company
by expanding their tax jurisdiction to reach out-of-state companies
with no physical presence (but an economic presence) in the state.
This is the most aggressive approach, and it has been adopted by ten
states through administrative or judicial holdings.
Alternatively, states can attempt to effectively levy the same tax
on the parent corporation operating within their borders. This can be
done simply by denying deductions to income for royalty payments
made to related companies, thereby preventing income from being
transferred out-of-state through the trademark licensing device; five
states have adopted this method.8 More comprehensively, the taxation
of the parent can take the form of combined reporting, as is done by
sixteen states Combined reporting treats the parent and subsidiary as
one entity for income tax purposes, making intra-entity transfers of in-
come meaningless. Eighteen states have yet to do anything to combat
the growing use of trademark holding companies to avoid income
taxes.'°
7 These states are: Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. See John J. Cronin and Maryann B. Gall, Eco-
nomic Nexus:A Case Study, 14 State Tax Notes 535,537-39 (1998) (collecting authorities).
8 These states are: Alabama, Connecticut, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Ohio. See Part
III.A.
9 These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah. See
Mazerov, Closing Three Common Corporate Income Tax Loopholes at 8 (cited in note 1).
10 Four states, Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, and New Hampshire, have made argu-
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II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A BARRIER TO DIRECTLY TAXING
OUT-OF-STATE TRADEMARK HOLDING COMPANIES
Directly taxing out-of-state trademark holding companies would
treat such companies the same as any non-domiciliary company oper-
ating within the state. This approach has many advantages: it is the
most effective method of preventing the use of trademark holding
companies as a tax avoidance device; it requires little change in the in-
come tax statutes of most states; it expands, rather than constrains, the
existing tax powers of states; and it accurately taxes the income that is
targeted. Any discussion of taxing trademark holding companies
therefore must begin with an analysis of the availability of this
method.
The strongest objection to the use of direct taxation of out-of-
state trademark holding companies is that it is forbidden by the dor-
mant Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has held that a company
must have a "physical presence" in a state for the state to levy sales
taxes on it." State courts, however, are divided over whether this
physical presence requirement should be extended to cover income
taxes as well.2 This Comment argues that the physical presence re-
quirement does apply to income taxes, and that the dormant Com-
merce Clause therefore prevents the direct taxation of out-of-state
trademark holding companies from being a viable solution for the
states.
A. The Physical Presence Requirement of the Dormant
Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause
contains a dormant aspect that limits the power of states to regulate
interstate commerce." This limitation extends to the state power of
taxation over interstate commerce." Under modern Commerce Clause
ments for directly taxing out-of-state companies in tax audits, without adopting formal regula-
tions. See Paul R. Comeau, Timothy P. Noonan, and Andrew B. Sabol, Intangibles Holding
Companies: Life after Geoffrey 7, online at http://www.hodgsonruss.com/files/holding.pdf (visited
Sept 18, 2003). Four states, Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming, do not levy
corporate income taxes and thus need no solution to this problem. See Mazerov, Closing Three
Common Corporate Income Tax Loopholes at 2 table 1 (cited in note 1). Michigan does not have
a corporate income tax, but its Single Business Tax has a profit component measured by the
federal income tax due from the company. See Mich Comp Laws Ann §§ 208.3(3), 208.9(1) (West
1998).
1 Quill Corp v North Dakota, 504 US 298 (1992).
12 See text accompanying notes 30-34. •
13 See South Carolina State Highway Department v Barnwell Brothers, Inc, 303 US 177,185
(1938) (holding that state statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce are invalid un-
der the Commerce Clause).
14 See Webber v Virginia, 103 US 344, 350-51 (1880) (invalidating, under the Commerce
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jurisprudence, state taxes levied upon interstate commerce must sat-
isfy the four-part test developed in Complete Auto Transit, Inc v
Brady.'" This test requires that the tax: (1) be applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) be fairly appor-
tioned, (3) not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) be
fairly related to the services provided by the state."6
Direct taxation of out-of-state trademark holding companies
meets the latter three requirements. The taxation of income earned by
the trademark holding companies from sales made to consumers (or
parent corporations) in the taxing state is not likely to raise fair ap-
portionment difficulties: A scheme where each state taxes the portion
of net corporate income earned from consumers within its borders
will not lead to multiple taxation. The income tax statutes concerned
are generally applicable, not dependent on the crossing of state bor-
ders. Finally, the taxing state would almost certainly provide some
services to the out-of-state trademark holding company to justify the
tax, such as providing a forum to sue for breaches of contract and pro-
tecting the company's intangible property present in the taxing state."
The only open Commerce Clause question is whether the trademark
holding company has a "substantial nexus" with the taxing state.
The leading case on the substantial nexus prong of the Complete
Auto test is Quill Corp v North Dakota." Quill Corporation, an out-of-
state mail order company, challenged the constitutionality of a North
Dakota statute requiring the corporation to collect use taxes from
sales to North Dakota consumers.2"While North Dakota had the
power to levy its use tax on its own residents for their purchases from
Quill, it remained unclear whether this taxing power allowed the state
to require Quill to collect the tax for the transaction.
In National Bellas Hess, Inc v Department of Revenue of Illinois,'
a similar case twenty-five years earlier, the Court held that the lack of
physical presence prevented the imposition of use tax collection upon
out-of-state mail order companies under both the Due Process and
Clause, a Virginia statute requiring out-of-state manufacturer's sales representatives to pay a li-
cense tax).
15 430 US 274 (1977).
16 Idat279.
17 See Fulton Corp v Faulkner, 516 US 325,331 (1996).
18 See Goldberg v Sweet, 488 US 252,257 (1989).
19 504 US 298 (1992).
20 A use tax is levied for the use or consumption of a good or service. Technically, it is lev-
ied upon the purchaser; however, the responsibility for collecting and paying the use tax gener-
ally lies with the seller. See, for example, ND Century Code § 57-40.2-07 (2002).
21 386 US 753 (1967).
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Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.2 However, Bellas Hess was an
old precedent, based on a discarded doctrine that forbade all direct
burdens on interstate commerce.3
The Court in Quill affirmed Bella Hess's holding with respect to
the Commerce Clause, but overruled its due process holding. With re-
gard to the latter, the Court held that the evolution of due process
doctrine after International Shoe Co v Washington" warranted the re-
jection of the rigid requirement of physical presence. Instead, the
Court favored a more flexible inquiry into whether the company had
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the taxing state. In line with its
more recent due process decisions, such contacts could include the
"continuous and widespread solicitation of business" within the taxing
state so long as the collection of the tax did not offend "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice."2
However, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Bellas Hess with
respect to the Commerce Clause. It distinguished the Commerce
Clause from the Due Process Clause, arguing that the Commerce
Clause concerned itself with the effects of state regulation on the na-
tional economy, whereas the Due Process Clause was concerned with
individual fairness. 6 The Court held that, though formalistic, "the
bright-line rule of Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the dormant Com-
merce Clause" by creating a safe harbor from use and sales taxes "for
vendors whose only connection with customers in the taxing State is
by common carrier or the United States mail."'"
The Quill Court did not decide whether its holding extended be-
yond sales and use taxes to income and other types of taxes that are at
issue with trademark holding companies. The Court's opinion contains
textual bases to argue both sides of this question. The Court stated
that "in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other
types of taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line, physical-
presence requirement.""' On the other hand, the Court also cautioned,
"Although we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articu-
lated the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess estab-
22 Id at 758-60.
23 See, for example, Leloup v Port of Mobile, 127 US 640, 648 (1888) ("[N]o State has the
right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form."). The Supreme Court abandoned this test
in Complete Auto and replaced it with the four-part test introduced earlier in this Comment. See
text accompanying notes 14-15.
24 326 US 310 (1945).
25 Quill, 504 US at 307-08.
26 Idat312.
27 Id at 314-15.
28 Idat317.
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lished for sales and use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation
of the Bellas Hess rule."'"
B. Extending the Physical Presence Requirement to Limit Income
Taxation of Out-of-State Companies
State courts have split on whether Quill is limited only to sales
and use taxes or applies also to income taxes. If Quill applies to in-
come taxes, then states may not tax the out-of-state trademark holding
companies that have no physical presence, rendering direct taxation of
trademark holding companies unconstitutional.
Geoffrey, Inc v South Carolina Tax Commission"' is the leading
case in support of the view that Quill does not apply to income taxes.
In Geoffrey, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered whether
the state of South Carolina could tax a trademark holding company
that, with no physical presence in South Carolina, was licensing
trademarks to its parent operating in South Carolina. The court
adopted a liberal conception of nexus, holding that the presence of in-
tangible property generally is a sufficient nexus to levy income tax.' It
thereby held that the state could constitutionally tax the out-of-state
trademark holding company.
The Geoffrey opinion gave little consideration to Commerce
Clause constraints, except to argue that the Quill Court did not explic-
itly encompass income taxes in its decision. Other state courts soon
began to disagree with Geoffrey on this issue, arguing that though
Quill involved a use tax, the underlying principle was nevertheless ap-
plicable to other types of taxes." Their argument was stated succinctly
by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in J.C. Penney National Bank v
Johnson:
While it is true that the Bellas Hess and Quill decisions focused
on use taxes, we find no basis for concluding that the analysis
29 Id at 314.
3) 313 SC 15,437 SE2d 13 (1993).
31 Id at 18, citing International Harvester Co v Wisconsin Department of Taxation, 322 US
435, 441-42 (1944) (holding that a state may constitutionally impose upon an in-state corpora-
tion the responsibility of collecting a tax on dividends to be distributed to stockholders, including
those not residing in the taxing state).
32 Geoffrey, 437 SE2d at 16-17.
33 See, for example, Guardian Industries Corp v Department of Treasury, 18 Mich App 363,
499 NW2d 349, 356 (1993) ("[A]fter Quill, it is abundantly clear that [the taxpayer] must show a
physical presence within a target state to establish a substantial nexus to it."). Compare SYL Inc
v Comptroller, 1999 Md Tax LEXIS 3 (Md Tax Ct 1999) (rejecting Geoffrey's substantial nexus
analysis but declining to extend Quill to income taxes).
34 19SW3d 831 (Tenn Ct App 1999).
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should be different [for franchise and excise taxes].... Any con-
stitutional distinctions between the franchise and excise taxes
presented here and the use taxes contemplated in Bellas Hess
and Quill are not within the purview of this court to discern."
In order to uphold the taxation of trademark holding companies,
there must be a legal distinction between use taxes and income taxes.
There are two potential reasons to distinguish between the two taxes.
The first would be if the Quill or Bellas Hess opinion articulated a le-
gal distinction between the two taxes. The second would be that the
two taxes have different economic effects. This section addresses these
potential reasons and concludes that neither requires distinguishing
use taxes from income taxes. Quill's physical presence requirement
should apply to income taxes.
1. The economics of taxes.
A possible difference between income taxes and sales and use
taxes may be drawn from international trade law, where economists
have articulated a theoretical difference in the effects of income and
sales taxes on trade, known as the "forward-shifting" theory. In the
short run, if the seller is assumed to operate on a profit-maximizing
strategy, a tax levied on income cannot affect the price or quantity of
goods supplied because any changes in either will only reduce the tax-
able income further, and reduce the after-tax income as a result. That
is, the only way to reduce the income tax payable is to reduce gross in-
come, and for income taxes of less than 100 percent, this would also
reduce the after-tax income of the seller. A sales or use tax levied on
gross receipts, however, may be partly shifted to the consumer by in-
creasing the price of the taxed item and reducing the quantity sold.
Since the sales tax is levied on revenues and not profits, it is possible
to reduce the tax payable by producing and selling fewer units, as this
reduces taxable revenues. The combination of tax savings and cost sav-
ings (from reducing production) could be greater than the revenue
losses from selling fewer units, making this economically rational for
sellers." Since quantity sold decreases (and prices increase from
reduced supply), interstate trade is decreased. Sales and use taxes are
thus more effective in discouraging interstate trade in an item than are
income taxes. Such reasoning would seem to justify a more stringent
standard, such as a physical presence requirement, for the imposition
of sales and use taxes on out-of-state companies.
35 Id at 839.
36 For a more detailed discussion of the forward-shifting theory in the context of interna-
tional trade, see generally Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT Law and International Economic Or-
ganization 214-15 (Chicago 1970).
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In United States Glue Co v Oak Creek," the Supreme Court rec-
ognized this qualitative difference between taxes on net income and
taxes on gross receipts, including sales and use taxes. The Court stated:
A tax upon gross receipts affects each transaction in proportion
to its magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profitable or
otherwise. Conceivably it may be sufficient to make the differ-
ence between profit and loss, or to so diminish the profit as to
impede or discourage the conduct of the commerce. A tax upon
the net profits has not the same deterrent effect, since it does not
arise at all unless a gain is shown over and above expenses and
losses, and the tax cannot be heavy unless the profits are large."
However, the economic difference between these two types of
taxes is not so straightforward. First, the empirical evidence on the va-
lidity of the forward-shifting theory is inconclusive. While sales and
use taxes, like other taxes on gross receipts (including tariffs), are
likely to reduce quantity and increase price, studies suggest that in-
come taxes may have a similar effect even in the short run.0 In any
case, the lack of short-run shifting will lead to long-run declines in in-
vestment in the taxed entity as the return on capital declines as a re-
sult of the income tax."'
Second, and more importantly, the argument made above for
stricter limitations upon the ability of states to levy sales and use taxes
because of their capacity to restrict trade considers only the effect of
the tax on the quantity of interstate trade and not the distribution of
the tax burden. Sales and use taxes are effective in changing quantity
and price only because part of the burden may be shifted to consum-
ers-the consumers of the taxing state. Income taxes, in contrast, can-
not be so shifted if the forward-shifting theory holds true, and there-
fore the burden of the tax is borne fully by the out-of-state company.
Since one goal of the dormant Commerce Clause is to ensure that
each state taxes only its "fair share" of interstate commerce, the
method of taxation that would be more effective in placing the burden
on out-of-state companies should face stricter, not looser, scrutiny.
When the focus is placed on the distribution of the state tax, Oak
Creek is distinguishable because it involved the taxation of an in-state
37 247 US 321 (1918).
38 Id at 329.
39 See Marian Krzyzaniak and Richard A. Musgrave, The Shifting of the Corporation In-
come Tax: An Empirical Study of Its Short-Run Effect upon the Rate of Return 43-49 (Johns
Hopkins 1963) (presenting an empirical analysis of income tax shifting in manufacturing firms).
40 See id at 3-4.
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company engaged in interstate commerce." At the time of Oak Creek,
a state could not impose direct interference with the free flow of
commerce, even upon its own domestic corporations.2 A sales or use
tax burden is partly borne by the purchaser; an income tax burden is
fully borne by the seller. A sales tax levied upon an in-state company
for its sales to out-of-state customers would both reduce the quantity
of interstate commerce and place part of the burden of the tax upon
out-of-state consumers. An income tax, in contrast, would be fully
borne by the in-state seller and have no effect on the price or quantity
of interstate commerce."4 The situation is quite different in the case of
out-of-state companies as in Bellas Hess or Quill: Although an income
tax on out-of-state companies might not affect the amount of inter-
state commerce, the income tax is more likely to impermissibly trans-
fer a state's tax burden onto out-of-state companies. Therefore, eco-
nomic theory not only fails to support the Geoffrey principle as a basis
for the distinction between income and sales taxes, it actually supports
placing stringent limits on the income taxation of out-of-state compa-
nies. A physical presence requirement for income taxes is necessary to
prevent states from shifting their tax burdens onto out-of-state com-
panies. It is not as necessary for use taxes, because the taxing state's
own consumers will end up bearing part of the burden of the use tax.
2. Stare decisis and reliance.
Historically, the Supreme Court has been hostile to sales and use
taxes, and Bellas Hess was part of this tradition." Does stare decisis
compel continued adherence to it only in the area of sales and use
taxes? On this reading, the Court would not feel compelled to extend
the physical presence requirement to a new area like income taxes.
The remnants of the discredited but not discarded Bellas Hess doc-
trine would thereby create a distinction between the two types of
'taxes for the purposes of Quill.
The Quill Court noted this reliance argument when it observed
that a substantial mail-order industry had developed due in part to the
exemption from state taxation created in Bellas Hess.4 Justice Scalia
suggested in a concurrence that this argument be taken even further:
41 See Oak Creek, 247 US at 325.
42 See Freeman v Hewit, 329 US 249, 255-56 (1946) (holding that a direct tax by a state on
a seller in interstate commerce is invalid).
43 This assumes the forward-shifting theory holds. But if the theory does not hold, then
there is no economic reason to distinguish between income and use taxes at all.
44 See General Motors Corp v Washington, 377 US 436, 439-40 (1964) ("[Tjhe Court has
approved ... a net income tax on revenues derived from interstate commerce.... However, local
taxes measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce have not always fared as well."). See
also Oak Creek, 247 US at 329.
45 Quill, 504 US at 316-17.
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It seems to me important that we retain our ability.., sometimes
to adopt new principles for the resolution of new issues without
abandoning clear holdings of the past that those principles con-
tradict .... [W]e ought not visit economic hardship upon those
who took us at our word.... It is my view, in short, that reliance
upon a square, unabandoned holding of the Supreme Court is
always justifiable reliance."
Thus, Bellas Hess created reliance by the mail-order industry on free-
dom from sales and use taxation, and this reliance compels the con-
tinued adherence to that precedent; but "new principles" would be
applied to undecided areas like income taxation.
However, if stare decisis does compel adherence to Bellas Hess,
the reliance interest cannot be based upon immaterial facts in the
case, but could justifiably be extended to the logical implications of
the holding in new areas, such as income taxation. Bellas Hess itself, as
Justice White noted in his dissent in Quill, was substantially under-
mined in its reasoning by the subsequent decision of National Geo-
graphic Society v California Board of Equalization.7 If the uncertainty
over the continued vitality of the Bellas Hess doctrine did not already
undermine the reliance interest of mail-order companies in Quill, why
would the difference between sales and income taxes preclude reli-
ance upon Quill by trademark holding companies? Unless there was
some independent ground for distinguishing sales and income taxes
that made the specific type of tax material to the analysis, merely de-
fining the difference to be significant would be circular to the reliance
reasoning.
But has the Supreme Court previously articulated a standard for
income taxes that would preclude Quill from being extended to that
field, making the difference between the two taxes legally significant?
Geoffrey cites International Harvester Co v Wisconsin Department of
Taxation"' as supporting its assertion that physical presence is not nec-
essary to levy income taxes. " But International Harvester is consistent
46 Id at 320-21 (Scalia concurring).
47 430 US 551 (1977). In National Geographic, the Court wrote:
[T]he relevant constitutional test to establish the requisite nexus for requiring an out-of-
state seller to collect and pay the use tax is not whether the duty to collect the use tax re-
lates to the seller's activities carried on within the State, but simply whether the facts dem-
onstrate "some definite link, some minimum connection, between [the State and] the per-
son it seeks to tax."
Id at 561, quoting Miller Bros v Maryland, 347 US 340, 344-45 (1954).
48 322 US 435 (1944).
49 437 SE2d at 18.
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with a physical presence requirement because the tax on dividends in
that case was imposed on a resident corporation.'The closest case
that does support Geoffrey is Northwestern States Portland Cement Co
v Minnesota,' which held, inter alia, that so long as the taxpayer has an
adequate nexus with the taxing state, "net income from the interstate
operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxa-
tion."'2 However, this holding was effectively overruled by Congress in
Public Law 86-272, which created a physical presence rule for sales of
tangible property." More importantly, while the Supreme Court has
not defined a clear standard for nexus, what standard it does define is
consistent with a physical presence requirement." Both Portland Ce-
ment and Stockham Valves & Fittings, the taxed companies in North-
western, were physically present in their respective taxing states." Be-
fore Quill, the Supreme Court had not created any bright-line stan-
dard for the income taxation of out-of-state companies that would be
incompatible with a physical presence rule.
3. Administrative burden.
The Bellas Hess Court based its reasoning partly on the adminis-
trative burden of a use tax on interstate commerce:
[I]f the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon [an out-
of-state mail-order company] were upheld, the resulting impedi-
ments [on] interstate business would be neither imaginary nor
remote. For if Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every
other State, and ... every other political subdivision through-
out the Nation .... The many variations ... could entangle [ ] in-
terstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to
local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose "a fair share
of the cost of the local government.""6
5 See International Harvester, 322 US at 441 ("[W]e do not doubt that a state has constitu-
tional power to make a levy upon a corporation, measured by so much of its earnings from
within the state as it distributes in dividends, and to make the taxable event the corporation's re-
linquishment of the earnings to its stockholders.").
51 358 US 450 (1959).
52 Id at 452. See also id at 465 (noting that both tax statutes in question also satisfied the
demands of the Due Process Clause).
53 Act of September 14, 1959, Pub L No 86-272, 73 Stat 555, codified as amended at 15
USC § 381 (2000).
54 See Northwestern, 358 US at 465 ("[Almost half of the corporation's income is derived
from the taxing State's sales which are shown to be promoted by vigorous and continuous sales
campaigns run through a central office located in the State.").
55 See id at 454-55.
56 Bellas Hess, 386 US at 759-60.
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The Court further noted that over 2,300 jurisdictions in the United
States imposed sales or use taxes in 1965,7 a number that has subse-
quently grown to approximately 6,000. In contrast, very few local
municipalities impose income taxes:" Because more jurisdictions levy
them, sales and use taxes create much higher administrative burdens
than income taxes for companies operating in multiple states. The
pragmatic argument is that the dormant Commerce Clause should
therefore limit sales and use taxes more stringently than income taxes.
But while it is true that more jurisdictions currently levy sales and
use taxes, no constitutional rule or natural imperative requires this to
be the case. The effect of maintaining the formalistic distinction be-
tween sales taxes and income taxes, based solely on the number of ju-
risdictions that choose to levy one instead of the other, would be to
punish those jurisdictions that choose to levy sales taxes. The doctrine
would create a constitutionally mandated preference for income taxes,
possibly inducing more jurisdictions to adopt them, even though these
taxes increase the burden on out-of-state companies. Having stated a
constitutional principle, the Court would have difficulty responding to
an increase in the number of jurisdictions levying income taxes as ju-
risdictions seek to broaden their tax bases and shift their tax burdens
onto out-of-state corporations through income taxes.
4. Summary.
The above analysis demonstrates that the J.C. Penney court was
right that there should be no constitutional distinction between use
taxes and other types of taxes-or at least not for income taxes on
trademark holding companies. The direct taxation of out-of-state
trademark holding companies offers a simple and effective remedy to
the problem posed by such companies, but is legally indistinguishable
from what was invalidated in Quill. States that wish to prevent the use
of trademark holding companies to reduce income tax liability must,
therefore, find some other method that comports with the require-
ments of the Commerce Clause.
57 Id at 759 n 12.
58 See Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, 1 State Taxation 6.11[2] (Warren 3d
ed 2001).
59 See id.
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C. Federal Legislation to Authorize Taxation of Trademark
Holding Companies
Even if such taxation is prohibited by the Commerce Clause,
states have one last option for directly taxing out-of-state companies:
to seek federal legislation authorizing them to do so. As the Court
noted in Quill, Congress has plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce, including granting power to states that the Commerce
Clause by itself denies." Congress could therefore legislate to allow
states to levy income taxes directly on out-of-state trademark holding
companies. However, present indications are that Congress is only
likely to strengthen, not abrogate, the physical presence requirement
for the levying of taxes by states.
The only legislation enacted in this area has been Public Law 86-
272, which exempts the sale of tangible property from state income
taxation where the only activity in the state is the solicitation of orders
to be approved and shipped from outside of the taxing state." There
are currently bills in Congress that would extend Public Law 86-272 to
require a "substantial physical presence" before a state may levy a
business activity tax. 2 While the proposed statute does not define
"substantial business activity," it does specifically exclude the presence
of intangible property and the solicitation of contracts or orders for
the sale of intangible property or services from constituting substan-
tial physical presence. This would abrogate Geoffrey's holding.
The bills presently before Congress indicate that it is unlikely
Congress will take action to overrule Quill, at least in the near future.
States therefore must rely on devices that are both already available
to them and consistent with the Commerce Clause.
III. ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO COMBAT
TRADEMARK HOLDING COMPANIES
If Geoffrey's approach of directly taxing the out-of-state trade-
mark holding company is prohibited by the Commerce Clause, what
may states do to capture the revenue that would be lost through this
device? Two solutions are commonly proposed: denying deductions to
parent corporations for trademark royalties paid to subsidiaries, and
requiring the combined reporting of parent and subsidiary income.
This Part argues that the denial of deductions for trademark royalties
would be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause on fair appor-
60 Quill, 504 US at 318.
61 See 15 USC § 381 (2000). Obviously, this law does not protect trademark holding com-
panies since the licensing of trademarks and the sale of technical assistance are sales of intangi-
ble property and services, respectively.
62 See HR 2526,107th Cong, 1st Sess (2001); S 664,107th Cong, 1st Sess (2001).
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tionment grounds, and the benefits of closing the trademark holding
company loophole do not justify the cost of implementing combined
reporting in all areas. It therefore advocates a remedy of combining
only trademark-related revenues and expenses for state income tax
purposes.
A. Limiting the Deductibility of Royalty Payments
Because trademark holding companies are effective only when
their parent companies may deduct the royalty payments from their
own incomes, limiting the deductibility of royalty payments will
greatly curtail the effectiveness of trademark holding companies as an
income tax avoidance device. Even though this narrow solution is less
complete than the alternative of adopting combined reporting, it re-
quires far less adjustment to the structure of the tax codes of most
states. Five states, Alabama," Connecticut,' Mississippi," North Caro-
lina, and Ohio,"7 have adopted this solution in some form. With the
exception of Ohio, which enacted its statute in 1991, these states have
only recently enacted these provisions.
The advantage of this solution is that it poses very few problems
under the substantial nexus prong of the Complete Auto test, as articu-
lated in Quill." Although the Commerce Clause requires both a con-
nection to the activity taxed and a connection to the actor, the power
of the taxing state over the parent corporation, and over the profits
earned by the parent corporation in the taxing state, is rarely in dis-
pute.
The strongest objection to implementing denial of deductions in
this form is a constitutional one. The scheme may violate the fair ap-
portionment requirement of the Commerce Clause by effectively
double-taxing the trademark holding company for its costs. To over-
come this objection, this section argues that the denial of deductions
to the parent for trademark royalties paid must also be accompanied
by an allowance of deductions to the parent for trademark expenses
63 Ala Code § 40-18-24 (2001).
64 Conn Gen Stat § 12-218c (2000) (restricting deductibility of intangible expenses incurred
in transactions with related members).
65 2001 Miss Laws 586 (limiting deductions of intangible expenses incurred in transactions
with related members).
66 NC Gen Stat § 105-130.7A (2001) (requiring royalties on payments to be added to net
income).
67 Ohio Rev Code Ann § 5733.042 (Anderson 2002).
69 504 US at 312-13.
69 Allied-Signal, Inc v Director, Division of Taxation, 504 US 768, 778 (1992) (stating that
"there must be a connection to the activity itself" and not "only to the actor").
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incurred by the subsidiary holding company. This effectively combines
the parent and subsidiary into a unitary business for trademark pur-
poses.
Two further objections may be made to this proposed solution.
First, the Unitary Business Principle allows such a combination only if
there is a "rational relationship" between the taxing state and the
trademark holding company. Second, this solution is limited in scope,
and does not reach other types of intra-entity transfers that divert in-
come to lower-taxing states. This section argues that the combination
of trademark holding companies and their parents will generally sat-
isfy the requirements of the Unitary Business Principle. It concludes
by considering the broader solution of combined reporting, but rejects
it as unnecessary for the specific problem created by trademark hold-
ing companies.
1. Fair apportionment.
Because companies that operate in multiple states have revenues
and costs that are not easily attributed to any particular state,"' these
costs and revenues must be divided among the states for income tax
purposes according to some apportionment formula. The fair appor-
tionment requirement exists to "prohibit [apportionment formulas]
that pass an unfair share of the tax burden onto interstate com-
merce."" The Court has not required any particular method of appor-
tionment.2 Rather, it examines the apportionment formula used for
"internal" and "external" consistency."
The test for internal consistency is whether, if every jurisdiction
applied the same apportionment formula, there would be double taxa-
tion.4 The test for external consistency is whether the apportionment
formula actually reflects a reasonable sense of how income is gener-
ated:" States may not choose apportionment formulas that lead to
taxation "out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted
... in that State,"" or lead "to a grossly distorted result.""
70 For example, the cost of the corporate headquarters cannot be said to contribute solely
to the income earned in the state where the headquarters is located, but must be shared among
the income from all the states where the corporation operates.
71 See Quill, 504 US at 313; Container Corp of America v Franchise Tax Board, 463 US 159,
169 (1983).
72 See Container Corp, 463 US at 164 (stating that "the Constitution imposes no single
formula on the States").
73 Id at 169-70.
74 See id at 169.
75 See id.
76 Id at 170, quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc v North Carolina, 283 US 123, 135 (1931).
77 Container Corp, 463 US at 170, quoting Norfolk & Western Railroad Co v State Tax
Commission, 390 US 317,326 (1968).
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If every state denied deductions for all trademark royalties paid
by the parent, and correspondingly excluded such royalties from the
taxable income of the trademark holding company, the trademark
holding company would be left with no taxable income against which
to deduct its costs. This possibility violates the internal consistency re-
quirement because it becomes possible that more than all of the in-
come of the parent and subsidiary combined would be taxed.' The de-
nial of a deduction to the parent, without more, therefore violates the
fair apportionment requirement.
To overcome the fair apportionment objection, therefore, a de-
duction must be allowed to the parent by reference to the trademark
holding company's actual costs in creating and maintaining the trade-
mark, apportioned by the same formula as that with which the income
is taxed. So long as the tax is levied upon the in-state, parent corpora-
tion, the Quill limitation will not apply to prevent this tax.
This type of regime is currently most closely resembled by the
Administrative Code of New York City.9 Under the New York City
rules, combined filing is required where: (1) there is common owner-
ship among the corporations; (2) the corporations and the proposed
combined group are engaged in a unitary business; and (3) filing on a
separate reporting basis distorts the taxpayer's income and tax liabil-
ity. However, this provision has a loophole that limits its effectiveness:
It requires combined filing only where separate reporting distorts the
taxpayer's income."' Given that the creation of a trademark holding
company is usually accompanied by mixed motives, rarely does the
company exist only to distort the taxable income of its parent. To ef-
fectively limit the trademark holding company's ability to exploit the
tax loophole created by separate accounting of subsidiaries, the pre-
sumption should be reversed: Combined filing would be required
78 See Container Corp, 463 US at 169. To take a simplified example: Suppose the parent
corporation had total revenues of $100, $90 of its own costs, and the subsidiary trademark hold-
ing company had $10 of costs from maintaining the trademark, with no other income. The net
profit of the unitary business of the parent and subsidiary combined would be zero. If the parent
paid $10 of royalties to the trademark holding company, the denial of the deduction for royalties
would create a taxable income of $10 for the parent corporation, and a deductible loss of $10 for
the trademark holding company. But if all jurisdictions denied a deduction for royalty payments,
the trademark holding company would never have any income against which to deduct this loss,
and the deduction would be wasted. The unitary business would pay taxes on $10 of income
when real income was zero.
79 See NYC Admin Code § 11-605.4 (2001).
8) The weakness of New York City's rule is exposed by the fact that, in a separate case in
New York, Toys "R" Us was able to prevail on a claim that filing separately from Geoffrey (Toys
"R" Us's trademark holding company) did not distort its tax liability. In the Matter of the Petition
of Toys "R" US-NYTEX, Inc, 1999 NY City Tax LEXIS 31 (NYC Tax Apps Trib).
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unless the taxpayer could prove that separate reporting does not dis-
tort income. Alternatively, the presumption against the taxpayer could
be made irrebuttable, and a deduction allowed only to the extent of
the trademark holding company's actual trademark-related costs. This
more stringent method would prevent abuse, as the company would
have to prove not only a general lack of distortion, but would also
have to specify affirmatively the expenses that are legitimately enti-
tled to a deduction.
Because such a regime effectively combines the parent and sub-
sidiary for the purpose of taxing trademark royalties, it could not be
argued that the tax is on the parent's in-state activities alone. In cases
where the parent corporation is not domiciled in the taxing state, to
include the subsidiary trademark holding company's out-of-state costs
requires that the subsidiary and the parent be treated as parts of a sin-
gle unitary business. The Unitary Business Principle places limits on
when this may be done.
2. The Unitary Business Principle.
The Unitary Business Principle is the "linchpin" of the fair appor-
tionment test."' Even though states have the power to provide their
own definition of "income" for their income taxes, the Complete Auto
test requires that there must nevertheless be "a rational relationship
between the income attributed to the [taxing] State and the intrastate
value of the enterprise."" Are the incomes of trademark holding com-
panies placed beyond state tax powers, even via their in-state parents,
for lack of any "rational relationship"?
Almost all trademark holding companies, if they conducted any
significant amount of licensing to their parent corporations, would sat-
isfy the requirements of unitary business."' In Container Corp of Amer-
ica v Franchise Tax Board,m the Supreme Court considered contacts
including the provision of "advice and consultation regarding manu-
facturing techniques, engineering, design, architecture, insurance, and
cost accounting to a number of its subsidiaries, either by entering into
technical service agreements with them or by informal arrangement"
as sufficient to establish a unitary business." Only a trademark holding
81 ASARCO Inc v Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 US 307,317 (1982).
82 Mobil Oil Corp v Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 US 425, 437 (1980). See also
International Harvester, 322 US at 441 ("In determining whether a tax is within the state's consti-
tutional power, we look to the incidence of the tax and its practical operation, and not its charac-
terization by state courts.").
83 The factors to be considered are (1) functional integration; (2) centralization of man-
agement; and (3) economies of scale. Allied-Signal, 504 US at 781.
84 463 US 159 (1983).
85 Idat 173.
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company that did extensive licensing to third parties would have a
credible argument for protection under the Unitary Business Princi-
ple. Such companies would likely be bona fide discrete business en-
terprises and would not raise the same tax avoidance concerns as
holding companies that licensed trademarks to parent companies
where the royalty is not subject to market comparisons.
3. Summary.
The denial of a deduction for royalty expenses paid to related
companies, with the necessary allowance of a substitute deduction for
the related company's actual costs, should be an effective and uncom-
plicated method of preventing the avoidance of taxation through
trademark holding companies while preserving their economic bene-
fits, such as economies of scale through centralization. While this solu-
tion will not remove all possible loopholes arising from related party
transactions, it will address the particularly prevalent form taken in
trademark holding companies. If one's only concern is to target
trademark holding companies, this is a more narrowly tailored solu-
tion that will effectively tackle the problem.
The incompleteness of this solution is an unavoidable conse-
quence of its relative simplicity. To eliminate the underlying problem
of related-party transactions, the combination of revenues and ex-
penses would be extended beyond trademark activities. Such a rem-
edy becomes combined reporting-a more comprehensive, but also
more complicated and costly reform of state income tax laws.
B. Combined Reporting
Sixteen states use a combined reporting system.6 The state levies
tax on a pro rata share of all the income of a corporation and all its
subsidiaries according to an apportionment formula, as opposed to the
practice of taxing each company separately. Provided that the trade-
mark holding company qualifies as part of the unitary business, which
is required for any taxation regardless of the Quill limitation, transfers
of income between different parts of the unitary business do not have
any effect on tax liability.
The Supreme Court has ruled that combined reporting does not
offend the substantial nexus requirement of Quill and Bellas Hess.
Though combined reporting determines the tax payable by reference
86 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah. See Mazerov, Closing
Three Common Corporate Income Tax Loopholes at 8 (cited in note 1).
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to the income of subsidiaries who have no physical presence in the
taxing state, the ultimate tax liability lies with the in-state, physically
present part of the unitary business.
Combined reporting is a comprehensive system that removes tax
incentives to shift income within the corporate structure, yet allows
such transfers where they result in economic benefits. It is therefore
generally favored by academics." Its expansion of the definition of the
taxable entity to include affiliates that would otherwise be beyond the
taxing jurisdiction of the state creates hostility from business, which
generally faces higher tax bills as a result.
A stronger objection, however, is that to create a combined re-
porting system requires substantial modification to the existing tax re-
gime, entailing significant administrative costs in making such a transi-
tion. For the single problem posed by trademark holding companies,
the drastic change to combined reporting for all businesses does not
seem to be cost justified." Combined reporting does offer additional
benefits such as reaching a broader set of transactions between re-
lated entities, but whether states might otherwise choose to adopt
combined reporting for these additional benefits is beyond the scope
of this Comment.'
87 See Barclays Bank v Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 US 298,311 n 10 (1994) (in-
ternal citations omitted):
Quill held that the Commerce Clause requires a taxpayer's "physical presence" in the taxing
jurisdiction [California] before that jurisdiction can constitutionally impose a use tax. The
California presence of the taxpayers before us is undisputed, and we find nothing in Quill
to suggest that California may not reference the income of corporations worldwide with
whom those taxpayers are closely intertwined in order to approximate the taxpayers' Cali-
fornia income.
8 See, for example, Michael J. McIntyre, Paull Mines, and Richard D. Pomp, Designing a
Combined Reporting Regime for a State Corporate Income Tax: A Case Study of Louisiana, 61 La
L Rev 699, 700 (2001) (suggesting a method for Louisiana to change its corporate tax structure
to require that multistate corporations use combined reporting).
89 See, for example, Barclays Bank, 512 US at 307,309 & n 8 (showing increased tax liabil-
ity under a combined reporting system). See also Avrum D. Lank and Steven Walters, Tax on
Profits Has No Teeth, Milwaukee J Sentinel 1 A (Apr 14, 2002) (reporting business opposition to
combined reporting in Wisconsin).
' " This is, of course, an empirical question. Proponents of closing the trademark holding
company loophole have estimated the additional revenue accruing to some states to be in excess
of $100 million annually. See, for example, Jay Hancock, Maryland Needs to Close Out-of-State
Tax Loophole, Baltimore Sun 1D (Feb 5,2003). Others have given estimates as low as $5 million.
See Young, Diverting Income, St. Louis Post-Dispatch at BI (cited in note 1). In any case, these
estimates do not consider the limited incremental benefit of adopting combined reporting for all
business operations over the cheaper remedy that this Comment advocates.
91 Another possible solution that this Comment has not considered is that instead of levy-
ing an income tax, a state could levy a use tax on all trademark and intangible purchases, payable
by the in-state parent corporation. As long as such a tax is applied equally to intrastate licensing
of trademarks, it is unlikely to run afoul of the Commerce Clause's non-discrimination require-
ment. However, this would levy both an income tax and a use tax on trademarks. The disadvan-
tage of such a solution would be that it creates an economic distortion in the make-or-buy deci-
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CONCLUSION
Trademark holding companies have become a popular form of
tax avoidance. While states are under no obligation to tax these enti-
ties, the ability to avoid income tax while enjoying the benefits of do-
ing business in a state poses a grave revenue concern for the states.
This Comment has explored various methods to close this tax loop-
hole.
While some academic commentary and ten states have seen di-
rect taxation as the best solution to the problem posed by trademark
holding companies, Supreme Court precedent in Quill dictates that
the solution be found elsewhere. Physical presence of the taxed entity
is a bright-line rule that the Court has refused to abandon and Con-
gress is only likely to reinforce; but there is no reason why the line
should not be drawn around both income and sales taxes. If the reaf-
firmance of Bellas Hess in Quill was dictated by formalism, its exten-
sion to income taxes is required for consistency in reasoning.
Operating under the constraints of physical presence, the only so-
lution is for states to tax the parent corporation instead. A full com-
bined reporting system for all corporate income tax would not be an
economical solution to this problem. The cheaper option of denying
deductions to parent corporations would overtax companies for le-
gitimate trademark maintenance expenses and violate fair apportion-
ment. Combining the parent and subsidiary only for trademark reve-
nues and costs is the most effective solution, eliminating trademark
holding companies as a tax avoidance device, while avoiding the cost
of a full transition to combined reporting.
sion: Companies that license trademarks for legitimate business purposes must pay the use tax,
while companies developing trademarks in-house do not.
92 In fact, they may not wish to: Multi-jurisdictional corporations that set up these tax
avoidance devices may be more likely to be sensitive to tax rates and have the option of moving
elsewhere.
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